Biological Theory and the Metaphysics of Race: A Reply to Kaplan and Winther

In Kaplan and Winther’s recent article (Biol Theory. doi:10.1007/s13752-012-0048-0, 2012) they argue for three bold theses: first, that ‘‘it is illegitimate to read any ontology about ‘race’ off of biological theory or data’’; second, that ‘‘using biological theory to ground race is a pernicious reification’’; and, third, that ‘‘race is fundamentally a social rather than a biological category.’’ While Kaplan and Winther’s theses are thoughtful, I show that the arguments that their theses rest on are unconvincing. In order to be constructive, I go on to show exactly how one can use biological theory and data to legitimately infer an ontological view of race, to infer a biological view of race that is not a reification, and to argue that race is both socially constructed and biologically real.