Carrot or Stick? The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences in a Haystack Model∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies the evolution and the co-evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive in evolution provided individuals interact within separate groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable. Secondly, preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely. Finally, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, but punishers crowd out rewarders. JEL-Classification: C72, D63, D64, D83
منابع مشابه
Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences∗
This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within separated groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are...
متن کاملFlorian Herold: Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences
This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within separated groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are...
متن کاملAn Analysis of the Patterns of Policymaking in Iraq’s National Security During the Period of the Ba’ath Party’s Rule
Relying on its partisan principles and values, the Ba’athist regime– the period when Saddam Hussein was in charge in Iraq– sought a powerful government. Not respecting and believing in ethnical and sectarian differences and seeking the realization of national unity, Saddam tried to regulate security policies in a way in which he could assimilate the differing Iraqi society, using the policies o...
متن کامل1 The Evolution of Obedience Norms in the Repeated Carrot - and - the - Stick
Reciprocity norm in the U.S. Congress and state assemblies has been studied extensively. By contrast, obedience norms frequently observed in many legislative bodies outside the United States have received relatively little attention. We seek to provide an evolutionary account of obedience norms. Drawing on a detailed observation of the legislative game in the Korean National Assembly, we model ...
متن کاملLocalized competition, multimarket operation and collusive behavior
Localized Competition, Multimarket Operation and Collusive Behavior by Frank Verboven This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this product market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishm...
متن کامل