Emergence of Cooperation in Non-scale-free Networks

نویسندگان

  • Yichao Zhang
  • M. A. Aziz-Alaoui
  • Cyrille Bertelle
  • Shi Zhou
  • Wenting Wang
چکیده

Yichao Zhang, 2 M. A. Aziz-Alaoui, ∗ Cyrille Bertelle, Shi Zhou, and Wenting Wang Univ Normandy, France; ULH, LMAH, F-76600 Le Havre, FR CNRS 3335, ISCN, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, 76600 Le Havre, France Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom Univ Normandy, France; ULH, LITIS, ISCN, F-76600 Le Havre, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, 76600 Le Havre, France Department of Mathematics, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1405.0761  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2014