A New Method of the Single Transferable Vote and its Axiomatic Justification

A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification

We propose a new method for conducting Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections and provide a unified method for describing classic STV procedures (the Gregory Method, the Inclusive Gregory Method and the Weighted Inclusive Gregory Method) as an iterative procedure. We also propose a modification for quota definition that improves the theoretical properties of the procedures. The method is just...

Fuzzy transferable-utility games: a weighted allocation and related results

By considering the supreme-utilities among fuzzy sets and the weights among participants simultaneously, we introduce the supreme-weighted value on fuzzy transferable-utility games. Further, we provide some equivalent relations to characterize the family of all solutions that admit a potential on weights. We also propose the dividend approach to provide alternative viewpoint for the potential a...

The Axiomatic Justification of the Transferable Belief Model

Belief functions have recently been advocated as an alternative to probability functions for representing quantified belief. This new normative model has several merits, but these merits are not sufficient to justify its use. Some ‘axiomatic’ justification is also needed. Indeed the examination of the requirements that underlie the normative models of subjective behaviors provides usually the b...

Single Transferable Vote with Borda Elimination: A New Vote Counting System

Power allocation rules under fuzzy behavior and multicriteria situations

In this paper, we adopt supreme-utilities among fuzzy level (decision) vectors to propose a power allocation rule, its efficient extension and normalization in the framework of multicriteria fuzzy transferable-utility (TU) games. We also provide several axiomatic results to present the rationality for these rules. Based on different viewpoints, we introduce different formulations and dynamic re...