Are quantum particles objects?

It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine (1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this difference, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the difference between classical and quantum statistics – a view with long historical credentials.1 ‘Indistinguishable’ here mean permutable; that states of affairs differing only in permutations of particles are the same – which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical particles may also be counted as indistinguishable); and if, in that same tradition, albeit with certain exceptions, quantum particles are perfectly bona fide objects.