Repugnance as Performance Error: The Role of Disgust in Bioethical Intuitions

An influential argument in bioethics involves appeal to disgust, calling on us to take it seriously as a moral guide (e.g. Kass, Miller, Kahan). Some argue, for example, that genetic enhancement, especially via human reproductive cloning, is repellant or grotesque. While objectors have argued that repugnance is morally irrelevant (e.g. Nussbaum, Kelly), I argue that the problem is more fundamental: it is psychologically irrelevant. Disgust’s influence on moral judgment is best understood as an exogenous influence, yielding a “performance error” that does not reflect our understanding of moral matters, which is revealed by examining empirical data on moral judgment. This conclusion also challenges appeals to repugnance on other topics (such as homosexuality) and the idea that there is an innate moral foundation tied to disgust (contra Haidt). Draft Last Updated: May 27, 2015 Total Word Count: 7,367