The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games
نویسنده
چکیده
Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive equivalent criteria both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of superand submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests is used to illustrate how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.
منابع مشابه
The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences
We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions u...
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