Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners, but there are no endogenous choices subsequent to a matching. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C71, C72, C78, J41.
منابع مشابه
Stable matchings and linear programming
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