Balancing Zero-Sum Games with One Variable per Strategy
نویسندگان
چکیده
A key challenge in game design is achieving balance between the strategies available to the players. Traditionally this has been done through playtesting, with its difficult requirements of time, labor, and interpretation of results. To make it quicker and easier to balance games, we propose a game-theoretic approach that automatically balances strategies based on a mathematical model of the game. Specifically, we model the balance problem as modifying a zero-sum game, using one variable per strategy, so that every strategy has an incentive to be employed. We begin with a special case where these variables affect player payoffs multiplicatively, and show that the simple Sinkhorn-Knopp algorithm can be used to balance the game. We then proceed to analyze the more general case where the variables have a monotonic effect on payoffs, and show that it is amenable to standard optimization methods. We give examples inspired by well-known game series including Pokémon and Warhammer 40,000.
منابع مشابه
A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS
In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...
متن کاملStrategic Decompositions of Normal Form Games: Zero-sum Games and Potential Games
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are “strategically equivalent” if, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players’ strategies fixed) are identical. A zero-sum equivalent game is a game that is st...
متن کاملHustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution
We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player’s true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player “hustling”, or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player’s payoff, regardless of the true...
متن کاملDecision Theory III - Game Theory
We briefly introduce and discuss two two-player non-zero-sum games, mainly to illustrate that such games are substantially more complex to investigate than zero-sum games. Actually, the key aspect of such games is that the sum of the pay-offs to the two players is not constant over all pairs of strategies, as constant sum games are equivalent to zero-sum games (think about this; one can imagine...
متن کاملThe Effect of Malice on the Social Optimum in Linear Load Balancing Games
In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1 − α) and α fraction of the flow in a load balancing game. SOC tries to minimize the total cost faced by her players while MAL tries to maximize the same. If the latencies are linear, we show that this 2-player zero...
متن کامل