Stability of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Best-reply Potential Games
نویسنده
چکیده
A game with single-valued best-replies and a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game if and only if the sequential best-reply dynamics converge (Cournot stability). If the PSNE is not unique, convergence to the set of equilibria is still ensured. It follows, for example, that (a) any strictly quasi-concave supermodular game with a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game, (b) any strictly quasi-concave and dominance solvable game is a best-reply potential game, and (c) any strictly quasi-concave aggregative game with strategic substitutes is Cournot stable.
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