On the Complexity of Succinct Zero-Sum Games (Preliminary Version)

نویسندگان

  • Lance Fortnow
  • Russell Impagliazzo
  • Valentine Kabanets
  • Christopher Umans
چکیده

We study the complexity of solving succinct zero-sum games, i.e., the games whose payoff matrix M is given implicitly by a Boolean circuit C such that M(i, j) = C(i, j). We complement the known EXP-hardness of computing the exact value of a succinct zero-sum game by several results on approximating the value. (1) We prove that approximating the value of a succinct zero-sum game to within an additive factor is complete for the class promise-Sp 2 , the “promise” version of Sp 2 . To the best of our knowledge, it is the first natural problem shown complete for this class. (2) We describe a ZPP algorithm for constructing approximately optimal strategies, and hence for approximating the value, of a given succinct zero-sum game. As a corollary, we obtain, in a uniform fashion, several complexity-theoretic results, e.g., a ZPP algorithm for learning circuits for SAT [BCG96] and a recent result by Cai [Cai01] that Sp 2 ⊆ ZPP. (3) We observe that approximating the value of a succinct zero-sum game to within a multiplicative factor is in PSPACE, and that it cannot be in promise-Sp 2 unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses. Thus, under a reasonable complexity-theoretic assumption, multiplicative-factor approximation of succinct zero-sum games is strictly harder than additive-factor approximation.

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تاریخ انتشار 2003