Stable Coalition Structures under Restricted coalitional changes
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the e¢ cient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as su¢ cient conditions for which the e¢ cient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games. JEL classi cation codes: C70; C71; D62.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IGTR
دوره 16 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014