Type Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Multi - Glove Games

نویسندگان

  • Rodica Brânzei
  • Tamás Solymosi
  • Stef Tijs
چکیده

Multi–glove markets and corresponding games are considered. For this class of games we introduce the notion of type monotonic allocation scheme. Allocation rules for multi–glove markets based on weight systems are introduced and characterized. These allocation rules generate type monotonic allocation schemes for multi–glove games and are also helpful in proving that each core element of the corresponding game is extendable to a type monotonic allocation scheme. The τ -value turns out to generate a type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties. The same holds true for the nucleolus, for in multi–glove games these two solutions coincide. JEL Classification Code: C71 Key-words: multi-glove market game, monotonic allocation scheme, τ -value, nucleolus ∗Research supported in part by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund through grant OTKA T030945. The authors thank Ruud Hendrickx for his valuable comments. †Faculty of Computer Science, ”Al.I. Cuza” University, 11, Carol I Bd., 6600, Iaşi, Romania ‡Department of Operations Research, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration, 1828 Budapest, Pf. 489, Hungary. Corresponding author. Phone: +36-1-456 6757, fax: +36-1-456 6435, e-mail: [email protected] §CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

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تاریخ انتشار 2002