Incentive Based Ranking Mechanisms

نویسندگان

  • Rajat Bhattacharjee
  • Ashish Goel
چکیده

We consider ranking and recommendation systems based on user feedback. We make a case for sharing the revenue generated by such systems with users as incentive to provide useful feedback. Our main contribution are mechanisms for ranking/recommendation which gives incentive for the users to provide useful feedback and is resistant to selfish/malicious behavior (click spam). The mechanisms are designed to give higher incentives for discovering high quality entities rather than for merely providing additional positive feedback for already established entities. A page whose rating/ranking is at variance with its real quality represents an arbitrage opportunity. The mechanisms are simple enough to be used with existing technology in ranking and recommendation systems, requiring little or no extra effort by the users.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

A Theory of Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions

The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous first-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that ...

متن کامل

Simulating information creation in social Semantic Web applications

Appropriate ranking algorithms and incentive mechanisms are essential to the creation of high-quality information by users of a social network. However, evaluating such mechanisms in a quantifiable way is a difficult problem. Studies of live social networks of limited utility, due to the subjective nature of ranking and the lack of experimental control. Simulation provides a valuable alternativ...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments

The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous rst-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that re...

متن کامل

The Effect of Feedback and Incentive Mechanisms on Improving Residents’ Medical Record Documentation Procedure

Introduction: Studies indicate that using behavior changing interventions may improve medical record documentation. This study aimed to examine the effect of feedback and incentive mechanisms on medical record documentation among surgery residents in Kashan University of Medical Sciences. Methods: This quasi-experimental study examined the effect of feedback and incentive mechanisms on 19 surge...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006