A preference foundation for Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity aversion
نویسنده
چکیده
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduced an influential utility function for individuals in interpersonal contexts that captures self-centered inequity aversion. The power of this utility function lies in its good balance between parsimony and fit. This paper provides a preference foundation for exactly the model of Fehr and Schmidt (FS), so that the preference conditions satisfy exactly FS’s balance between parsimony and fit. Remarkably, FS is a special case of Schmeidler’s (1986, 1989) rank-dependent utility for decision under uncertainty.
منابع مشابه
On Inequity Aversion A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 34 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010