Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply
نویسندگان
چکیده
We examine equilibria individuals take unobs incentives in the insura individuals differ only productivities. Under t risk-productivity types generally differ from Wambach (2000). We JEL Classification :
منابع مشابه
Discussion Papers Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives introduce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with positive profits can occur even in the standard case in which individuals exogenously differ in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both privately known risks an...
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