Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem

At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular phenomenal consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments. The explanation typically proceeds along something like the following lines: there is something it is like to taste Green Chartreuse, to hear a chainsaw, to smell a skunk, to see the clear, blue sky. Each of these states has a distinctive subjective character or raw “feel” to it. These raw “feels”—qualia, as they are often called—resemble and differ from one another to varying degrees. The subjective “feel” of the experience of red, for example, is more like the subjective “feel” of the experience of orange than it is like the subjective “feel” of the experience of green. Subjective “feels” or qualia are what make the states possessing them phenomenally conscious. Further illumination is sometimes offered by noting that it is phenomenal consciousness that gives rise to talk of an explanatory gap and