FROM NASH TO WALRAS VIA SHAPLEY–SHUBIK BY PRADEEP DUBEY and JOHN GEANAKOPLOS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1065 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
نویسندگان
چکیده
We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash’s theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley–Shubik trading-post game. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
MONETARY EQUILIBRIUM WITH MISSING MARKETS BY PRADEEP DUBEY and JOHN GEANAKOPLOS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1063 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
We add inside and outside money to the standard GEI model. If there enough gains to trade via money, then monetary equilibrium (ME) exists and money has positive value, even when GEI fails to exist. The nonexistence of GEI shows up as a liquidity trap in terms of the ME. In sharp contrast to GEI, the ME are generically determinate not only in terms of real, but also financial, variables. © 2003...
متن کاملDETERMINACY WITH NOMINAL ASSETS AND OUTSIDE MONEY BY PRADEEP DUBEY and JOHN GEANAKOPLOS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1199 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
We build a finite horizon model with inside and outside money, in which interest rates, price levels and commodity allocations are determinate, even though asset markets are incomplete and asset deliveries are purely nominal.
متن کاملMONEY AND PRODUCTION, AND LIQUIDITY TRAP BY PRADEEP DUBEY and JOHN GEANAKOPLOS COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1200 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
We prove the existence of monetary equilibrium in a finite horizon economy with production. We also show that if agents expect the monetary authority to significantly decrease the supply of bank money available for short-term loans in the future, then the economy will fall into a liquidity trap today.
متن کاملPRICE-MEDIATED TRADE WITH QUANTITY SIGNALS: AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH BY PRADEEP DUBEY and SIDDHARTHA SAHI COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1096 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
We consider a mechanism in which individuals send signals, indicating how much of each commodity they are willing to put up for trade. The mechanism produces prices and redistributes the commodities. We require that the map from signals to trades and prices, satisfy certain axioms and show that there are in essence only a finite number of mechanisms (i.e. maps) which satisfy these axioms. They ...
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تاریخ انتشار 2003