Epistemic norms Engel Routledge 140509

5936 words 36634 signs 1. Epistemic normativity 2. Norms of rationality 3. Epistemic norms and concepts 4. The Ur-Norm of truth 5. Epistemic norms and epistemic values 1. Epistemic normativity When we evaluate our beliefs and our reasonings as justified or unjustified, good or bad, rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the term, normative judgements about them. It is often said that justification itself is a normative notion, and that epistemology is a normative discipline. But the nature of epistemic normativity is elusive, and there are several strands in these debates, many of which are common to the domain of practical or ethical normativity and to the domain of epistemic or cognitive normativity. (i) Norms and values. It is common to distinguish two kinds of normative notions, those which are deontic, and formulated in terms of oughts, right or wrong, prescriptions and permissions, and those which are teleological or axiological in terms of good, bad, valuable, virtuous or defective. There are important differences between these two kinds of normative properties. The former in general call for actions and can give rise to sanctions, and do not admit degrees, whereas the latter are more a matter of possession by the agent of a certain kind of sensitivity, call for praise or blame and are often comparative. The former are often associated to " thin " properties, whereas the second are often " thick " properties. One main problem about epistemic normativity is whether it should be formulated in terms of epistemic norms in the deontic sense or in terms of value-based notions and whether one has priority over the other. (ii) Norms, rationality and reasons. The notion of norm is commonly associated with the notion of rationality, both because norms concern one what one ideally ought to do or to think and because rationality seems to be normative in the sense that it prescribes a certain kind of conduct. But it is not clear in what sense rationality is normative rather than descriptive of ideal agents or believers. There is an important sense in which what rationality requires normatively differs what one has a reason to do or to think. Some think the latter has priority