Rational Choice Theory and Genomics

I HAD BETTER BEGIN BY CONFESSING that I am not an enthusiast for rational choice theory (hereafter RCT). It is not uncommon for devotees of RCT to suggest that it provides a quite general tool for understanding human behaviour, and should largely supersede traditional historical, cultural, and related theoretical approaches. While I am happy to acknowledge that RCT may provide a useful set of tools for certain specific kinds of problems, the attempts to apply it to almost every sphere of human activity seem to me somewhat grotesque. Indeed, I am generally sceptical of attempts to discover a general theoretical approach to human nature, and claims for this sort of application of RCT strike me as some of the most exaggerated. In an ambitious recent book, economist and philosopher of science Don Ross (2005) acknowledges that rational choice does not really have application to humans, but opines that it is perfectly suitable for describing the behaviour of many insects. But rather than concluding, as I have, that rational choice theory is of very limited use for understanding humans, Ross argues instead that the human mind is actually a loose confederation of insectlike components. So once one has found the right structural level at which to apply the RCT machinery, humans turn out to be perfectly