Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
نویسندگان
چکیده
Uniform-price auctions are studied in which the seller may cancel part of the supply after observing the bids. This feature eliminates many of the ‘collusive seeming’ equilibria of the auction. In equilibrium the seller always sells the full quantity. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
منابع مشابه
Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions∗
Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instr...
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Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instr...
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