Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
Consider a situation where a group of agents wishes to share the costs of their joint actions, and needs to determine how to distribute the costs amongst themselves in a fair manner. For example, a set of agents may agree to process their jobs together on a machine, and share the optimal cost of scheduling these jobs. This kind of situation can be modelled naturally as a cooperative game. In this work, we are concerned with cooperative games with supermodular costs. A set function r : 2N 7→ R is supermodular if
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