Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization
نویسنده
چکیده
Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191–1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285–299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions—a complete characterization of the SPE implementable choice rules is provided. The characterization consists of ∗, which strengthens ofAbreu–Senby adding it a restricted veto-power condition, and theunanimity condition. Under strict preferences ∗ is equal to . © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D82; D72
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 133 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007