BIDFLOW: a New Graph-Based Bidding Language for Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we introduce a new graph based bidding language for combinatorial auctions. In our language, each bidder submits to the arbitrator a generalized flow network (netbid) representing her bids. The interpretation of the winner determination problem as an aggregation of individual preferences represented as flowbids allows building an aggregate netbid for its representation. Labelling the nodes with appropriate procedural functions considerably improves upon the expressivity of previous bidding languages.
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