: Voting the Agenda
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منابع مشابه
Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games? Scott
A theorem due to McKelvey implies that, if a single agent controls the agenda of a spatial voting game, he can almost always design an agenda that yields whatever voting outcome he wishes. Here we make use of a geometrical construct called the “yolk” to demonstrate the existence of significant limits on such agenda control. We show that the feasibility of agenda control is inversely related to ...
متن کاملSequential voting and agenda manipulation
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreo...
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We propose two related equilibrium re nements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make o¤ers to sev...
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We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions, that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach allows a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allow comparisons between them, an...
متن کاملSequential Voting and Agenda Manipulation: The Case of Forward Looking Tie-Breaking
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. We show that a well-known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our c...
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We propose two related equilibrium re nements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make o¤ers to sev...
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