To “ Private Information and Insurance Rejections ” (
نویسنده
چکیده
THIS SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL CONTAINS FIVE APPENDIXES. Appendix A contains the proof of Theorem 1 and discusses Remark 1. Appendix B provides proofs for the lower bound approach discussed in Section 4.1. Appendix C discusses the data, including details for the covariate specifications and the sample selection. Appendix D discusses the empirical specification for the lower bound estimator, presents the decomposition discussed in Section 6.3, and presents additional robustness checks referred to in Section 6.5. Appendix E provides details on the specification and estimation of the structural approach referred to throughout Section 7. Finally, Appendix F presents a selection of pages from the LTC underwriting guidelines of Genworth Financial.
منابع مشابه
Private Information and Insurance Rejections.
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