Common Knowledge and Common Belief
نویسندگان
چکیده
Philosopher: Today, I suggest we discuss the important concepts of common knowledge and common belief. As far as I know, the first one to give a formal analysis of these concepts was the philosopher David Lewis, in his book Convention [131]. One of his examples is traffic conventions, about the role of common knowledge in how one behaves in road traffic. To explain this properly, I wonder if you would care to play a little game with me.
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