Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple one-to-one matching problem. Our results provide evidentiary support for a conjecture of Donald Knuth (1976, 1997) of thirty years standing.* Journal of Economic Literature Classification Codes: C78, D63, B41
منابع مشابه
Sex-oriented stable matchings of the Marriage Problem with correlated and incomplete information
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.
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