Household labor supply and intermarriage of immigrants: differences by gender

Intermarriage between a native and immigrant can affect the household’s supply of labor hours. Spouse selectivity on the basis of human capital, distribution of bargaining power, and labor supply coordination within the household can differ by type of marriage and gender of the immigrant—and, consequently, affect how spouses supply labor to the market. Using the 2010 American Community Survey, a household labor market specialization index is created. Raw two-limit Tobit estimates show lower specialization in intermarried households for both genders, compared to their intra-married counterparts. The finding for intermarried female households is reversed, and gender-based specialization increases, when controls for human capital are introduced. The role of immigrant education for both intermarried men and women is underscored—specialization differences, by type of marriage, are insignificant when the immigrant has post-college education. At lower levels of immigrant education, native spouses supply more market labor. Intermarriage may also skew bargaining power in favor of native husbands in immigrant female households.