Why Phenomenal Content Is Not Intentional
نویسنده
چکیده
I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2013