Recognizing Ambiguity How LAck of infoRmAtion ScAReS uS

In this paper, I will examine two different approaches to an experimental decision problem posed by Craig Fox and Amos Tversky. This decision problem is intended to illustrate the phenomenon called “ambiguity aversion” that is observed in decision situations under uncertainty. These situations occur when an agent is faced with a decision problem where the probabilities are not specified in advance or readily assessed based on the given information in the decision problem. Because ambiguity aversion in decisions under uncertainty is one of the most fundamental problems of traditional decision theory, in attempting to give an account of rational decision making Fox and Tversky offer a hypothesis to account for ambiguity aversion and explain the decision situations that exhibit this problem. After examining their explanation for ambiguity aversion, I will consider another possible approach to these decision problems under uncertainty viz. the recognition heuristic, which has