The constitutionality of regulating human genetic engineering: where procreative liberty and equal opportunity collide.

t Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School; Dipl. in Law, University of Oxford; J.D., New York University School of Law; B.A., University of Virginia. As this project has been in the works for quite some time, I can only mention some of those who generously contributed their time and wisdom. Earlier drafts were reviewed by Guido Calabresi, Stephen Carter, Donald Elliott, Thomas Emerson, Owen Fiss, Jay Katz, Myres McDougal, and Judith Thomson of the Yale Law School; Frank Ruddle of the Yale Biology Department; Welsh White of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Harvey Bender of the Notre Dame Biology Department; as well as Kathleen Spartana and Stefan Underhill. I also received valuable comments during presentations at Notre Dame, George Washington, and Tulane law schools. LeRoy Walters of the Kennedy Institute of Georgetown University, Nancy Rudden of the Oxford Biology Department, and David Gauthier and Ken Schaffner of the University of Pittsburgh Philosophy Department provided critical guidance at various stages of this endeavor. Research librarians David Boeck and Michael Slinger were quite helpful, as were my research assistants, John McGeeney, Carl Livingston, and William Cowden. The Universities of Notre Dame and Pittsburgh provided generous support. 1 Roger Angell, The Summer Game 41 (1972) (describing the attitude of a New York Mets fan toward the New York Yankees in 1962). 2 The opinions of the Supreme Court illuminate their centrality. The realm of liberty encompasses first amendment ideals of free speech, thought, and conscience. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970); Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law (1962). It also embraces procedural due process rules that circumscribe governmental power to confine and constrain, see, e.g., Jerold Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 Geo. L. J. 253 (1982), and substantive due process notions that eliminate governmental regulation from certain discrete areas, see, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L. J. 624 (1980). Equality appears most prominently in the jurisprudence of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023 (1979).