Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method

نویسندگان

  • Paul Dütting
  • Monika Henzinger
  • Ingmar Weber
چکیده

Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as “slots”, for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we show how to modify Kuhn’s Hungarian Method (Kuhn, 1955) so that it finds an optimal stable matching between advertisers and advertising slots in settings with generalized linear utilities, per-bidder-item reserve prices, and per-bidder-item maximum prices. The only algorithm for this problem presented so far (Aggarwal et al., 2009) requires the market to be in “general position”. We do not make this assumption.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Search , Market Equilibria , and the Hungarian Method

Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where n advertisers compete for the assignment of one of k sponsored search results, also known as “slots”, for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we sho...

متن کامل

Characterizing Optimal Syndicated Sponsored Search Market Design

The analysis to date of sponsored search auctions, originally conducted by Varian and independently by Aggarwal et al., has yet to describe more recent developments such as the emergence of interacting advertising exchanges. This paper assess the significance of such phenomena. Building on Gonen and Vassilvitskii’s model of sponsored search with reserve prices we depict advertising networks as ...

متن کامل

Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions

Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions Paul Milgrom First draft: August 16, 2007 This draft: October 13, 2007 A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of ei...

متن کامل

Analyzing data from sponsored search markets from an agent-based and complex systems perspective

This paper provides a comprehensive study of the structure and dynamics of online advertising markets, based on a dataset of sponsored search queries provided by Microsoft Research. The study was performed using techniques from agent-based computing, data mining and from the emergent discipline of complex systems analysis. First, we look at how the display rank of a URL link influences its clic...

متن کامل

On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities

In the increasingly important market of online search advertising, a multitude of parameters affect the performance of advertising campaigns and their ability to attract users’ attention enough to produce clicks. Thus far, the majority of the relevant literature assumed an advertisement’s probability of receiving a click to be dependent on the advertisement’s quality and its position in the spo...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010