Sequential Bayesian Persuasion∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper studies a Bayesian Persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one Receiver. Players can always observe signaling rules of prior players and their realizations. I develop a recursive concavification method to characterize the set of SPEa. I prove the existence of a special type of equilibrium, called the Silent Equilibrium, where at most one sender designs a nontrivial signaling rule. Also, I show that in zero-sum games, the truth-telling information structure is always supported in equilibrium. Finally, I make comparisons with the simultaneous multi-sender Bayesian persuasion model of Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017b) and examine the impact of the order of persuasion. A geometric version of Blackwell’s order is adopted for examination of informativeness.
منابع مشابه
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In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) senders’ information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper shows that these three conditions are also necessary to the r...
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