Approval voting: three examples
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a stronger solution concept than perfection is needed for a strategic analysis of this type of games. The second example shows that sophisticated voting can imply that the Condorcet winner gets no vote. The third example shows the possibility of insincere voting being a stable equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
Approval Voting on Large Poisson Games ∗
Approval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters, the Myerson’s Large Poisson Games. Three examples show that this voting rule does not always correctly aggregate preferences. The first one shows that a candidate ranked first by more than half of the voters need not be the Winner of the election under Approval voting. In the second one, we show that it can be th...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 35 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006