Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
نویسنده
چکیده
I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player’s payoff depends on his own and his neighbors’ actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. The main result is that a folk theorem holds if and only if no two players have the same set of neighbors.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 87 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014