Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects in which bidders can be budget constrained. The presence of budget constraints shrinks the equilibrium set. A family of equilibria with a high degree of competition, as well as a family of equilibria with a high degree of collusion, disappear. When the budget available to each bidder is private information then even a very small probability of having a budget constrained bidder may have a strong impact on th eequilibrium set, eliminating the most competitive equilibria. JEL classification number: D44
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