An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
We report an experiment on three house allocation mechanisms under complete information: random serial dictatorship with squatting rights, and two variants of the top trading cycles mechanism. Results show that the latter two are significantly more efficient than the former. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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