A Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the allocation and exchange of indivisible objects without monetary transfers. In market design literature, some problems that fall in this category are the house allocation problem with and without existing tenants, and the kidney exchange problem. We introduce a new class of direct mechanisms that we call "trading cycles with brokers and owners," and show that (i) each mechanism in the class is coalitional strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient, and (ii) each coalitional strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient direct mechanism is in the class. As corollaries, we obtain new characterizations in the aforementioned market design problems.
منابع مشابه
Optimal Strategy of State Lands allocation in Islamic Economics: Game Theory Approach
In the Islamic legal and economic system, a precise mechanism for land use is defined. The classification of lands, along with the flexible methods available to the government for the allocation of land, raises the question of what is the most desirable method for state lands allocation based on the Islamic legal and economic system? Accordingly, the purpose of the present study is to find a fa...
متن کاملPareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
Papai’s 2000 hierarchical exchange mechanisms for house allocation problems determine matchings as the outcome of multiple rounds of trading cycles. Any hierarchical exchange mechanism can be defined through a structure of ownership, which determines the ownership of houses after any round of trading cycles. Given a permutation of agents, a “permuted” hierarchical exchange mechanism can be cons...
متن کاملHouse Allocation with Transfers
We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley-Scar...
متن کاملHouse allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
In this paper we analyze two house allocation mechanisms each of which is designed to eliminate inefficiencies in real-life house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers. The Þrst mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a sister exchange economy which is constructed by assigning each existing tenant her current house and randomly assigning each newcomer...
متن کاملشبیه سازی الگوی پولی برای وزندهی رأی در تحلیل اقتصادی دموکراسی
The unequal allocation of economic resources, or other resources of wealth, regarding to the efficiency among the factors of production, is considered as one of the most important condition of optimal resource allocation in the market system. In other words, the market mechanism in the process of allocating resources among the factors of production rewards to the resources with higher returns. ...
متن کامل