Dynamic common agency

نویسندگان

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Juuso Välimäki
چکیده

A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. Incentives at an ex ante investment stage are analyzed and new efficiency results for the ex ante stage are obtained. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 111  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003