Non-eliminative Reductionism: Reconciling Qualia and Physicalism
نویسنده
چکیده
It may be that qualia are neither a uniquely hard problem that physicalism can only resolve by treating them as fundamental properties as Chalmers has suggested in some of his writings (1995, 1996, 2003), nor so ephemeral that they will disappear entirely once Science has solved all of the easy problems associated with the brain as Dennett has proposed in some of his (1988, 1991). It could be that qualia are valid and entirely explainable aspects of a reductionist universe, wholly ontologically reducible to physical states also perceived as brain states, but that they nevertheless entail epistemically irreducible experiential perspectival knowledge that is a necessary and justifiable additional element of a complete scientific account of the physical states in question.
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