Sting : an Automatic Defense System against Zero - Day Worm Attacks Seminar
نویسنده
چکیده
Dawn Song is an Assistant Professor at Carnegie Mellon University. She obtained her PhD in Computer Science from UC Berkeley. Her research interest lies in security and privacy issues in computer systems and networks. She is the author of more than 35 research papers in areas ranging from software security, networking security, database security, distributed systems security, to applied cryptography. She is the recipient of various awards and grants including the NSF CAREER Award and the IBM Faculty Award. She has served on numerous program committees of prestigious conferences including Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), ACM Computer and Communication Security (CCS), USENIX Security Symposium, Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS), USENIX Annual Technical Conference, Symposium on Recent Advance in Intrusion Detection (RAID), IEEE Infocom, ACM Sensor Networks and Systems Conference (SenSys).
منابع مشابه
Sting: An End-to-End Self-healing System for Defending against Zero-day Worm Attacks on Commodity Software
Complex computer systems are plagued with bugs and vulnerabilities. Worms such as SQL Slammer and hit-list worms exploit vulnerabilities in computer programs and can compromise millions of vulnerable hosts within minutes or even seconds, bringing down vulnerable critical services. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end self-healing approach to achieve the following goal: for a large class of v...
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We increasingly rely on highly available systems in all areas of society, from the economy, to military, to the government. Unfortunately, much software, including critical applications, contains vulnerabilities unknown at the time of deployment, with memory-overwrite vulnerabilities (such as buffer overflow and format string vulnerabilities) accounting for more than 60% of total vulnerabilitie...
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Control-flow hijacking attacks allow an attacker to subvert a value that is loaded into the program counter of a running program, typically redirecting execution to his own injected code. Such attacks can be used to completely subvert a remote system, and can rapidly infect all vulnerable machines when used by a fast-spreading worm. Currently, users of commodity software must rely on the vendor...
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Research in systems that automatically generate signatures to filter out zero-day worm instances at perimeter defense has received a lot of attention recently. While a well known problem with these systems is that the signatures generated are usually not very useful against polymorphic worms, we shall in this paper investigate a different, and potentially more serious problem facing automatic s...
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With the ever-growing proliferation of hardware and software-based computer security exploits and the increasing power and prominence of distributed attacks, network and system administrators are often forced to make a difficult decision: expend tremendous resources on defense from sophisticated and continually evolving attacks from an increasingly dangerous Internet with varying levels of succ...
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