Strategic Redistricting†

We develop and analyze a model of strategic redistricting. Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. We show that in the unique equilibrium parties maximally segregate their opponent’s supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, the election outcome is biased in favor of the stronger party and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. Finally, we incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game. When one party is in control of redistricting, the equilibrium policy choice is biased towards the policy preferences of the redistricting party’s supporters. However, if the district level uncertainty is sufficiently small, this effect disappears and redistricting becomes policy neutral. † We thank Thomas Eisenbach, David Epstein, Jonathan Katz, Thomas Palfrey and Andrea Prat for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation.