Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the latitude allowed by accounting rules. We argue that this interpretation may be premature because, if such association is indeed evidence of opportunism, we ought to observe subsequent poor performance, ceteris paribus. Following Core et al. (1999) we conduct our analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we confirm and extent prior literature and document a link between poor governance and managers’ accounting discretion. However, in the second stage we fail to detect a negative association between accounting discretion attributable to poor governance and subsequent firm performance. This suggests that, on average, in our relatively large sample, managers do not abuse accounting discretion at the expense of firms’ shareholders. Rather, we find some evidence that discretion due to poor governance is positively associated with future operating cash flows and ROA, which suggests that shareholders may benefit from earnings management, perhaps because it signals future performance. *Corresponding author: Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708; Tel: (919) 660 7859; Fax: (919) 660 7971; E-mail: [email protected]. The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions offered by Patty Dechow, Hemang Desai, Mark DeFond, Ron Dye, Jennifer Francis, Wayne Guay, Rebecca Hann, Michelle Hanlon, Hamid Mehran, D.J. Nanda, Karen Nelson, Per Olsson, Scott Richardson, Katherine Schipper, Terry Shevlin, Doug Skinner, K.R. Subramanyam and workshop participants at Duke University, University of Southern California, Washington University at St. Louis, 2003 Summer Symposium at the London Business School, 2003 European Finance Association meetings at Glasgow, 2003 Financial Economics and Accounting conference at Indiana University, Bloomington and the 2004 mid year Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) meetings at Austin. We thank Li Xu for research assistance. We acknowledge financial support from the Herbert O. Whitten Professorship, the Accounting Development Fund and the Business School Research Fund at the University of Washington, and the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.