Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences
نویسنده
چکیده
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting.In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice functionthat satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict mono-tonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofnessof a social choice function to the properties of Independence of IrrelevantAlternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function.Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry,neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May’s Theorem[11]. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strictmonotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 28 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007