Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
نویسنده
چکیده
The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch’s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy, 2007). Subject classification: C71, C72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009