Economic Development, Mobility and Political Discontent: An Experimental Test of Tocqueville's Thesis in Pakistan

We consider the thesis of Alexis de Tocqueville (1856) that economic development and increased mobility may generate political discontent that is not present in more stagnant economies. For many citizens, as they become aware of the potential for improvement, aspirations may increase faster than do living standards. Expanded opportunity may thus result in political discontent rather than in increased satisfaction with government as suggested in Tocqueville’s earlier work. We develop a formal model to capture Tocqueville’s (1856) verbal theory and test its predictions using a 2012–2013 face-to-face survey experiment conducted in Pakistan. The experiment utilizes standard treatments to manipulate either a participant’s perceptions of his own economic well-being, his perceptions of society-wide mobility, or both. As predicted by the theory, political discontent often rises the most when declining personal well-being coincides with high mobility. The results thus identify the conditions under which expanded economic opportunity can lead to political unrest. 1-2016 Elections and Electoral Rules We thank the dedicated team at Innovative Development Strategies (IDS), who in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), carried out the extensive data collection activities for our Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (RHPS). We also thank Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse and Tanguy Bernard for providing us with the Aspirations module from the IFPRI Ethiopia Rural Household Survey, which helped inform the Aspirations module in the Pakistan RHPS. We gratefully acknowledge insightful comments and guidance from Adam Meirowitz, Emily Nacol, Danielle Resnick, Alan Wiseman, and Elizabeth Zechmeister, as well as the discussants and participants at the 2016 annual meeting of the Behavioral Models of Politics at University of Pittsburgh, Midwest Political Science Association, and the Southern Political Science Association. All remaining errors are our own. Andrew Healy: Professor of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, One LMU Drive, Room 4229, Los Angeles, CA 90045 ([email protected]). Katrina Kosec: Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute, Development Strategy and Governance Division, 2033 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006 ([email protected]). Cecilia Hyunjung Mo: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, PMB 0505, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203 ([email protected]); W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow and Robert Eckles Swain National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 434 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305. Economic Development, Mobility and Political Discontent: An Experimental Test of Tocqueville’s Thesis in Pakistan∗ Andrew Healy† Katrina Kosec‡ Cecilia Hyunjung Mo§ May 25, 2016 Abstract We consider the thesis of Alexis de Tocqueville (1856) that economic development and increased mobility may generate political discontent that is not present in more stagnant economies. For many citizens, as they become aware of the potential for improvement, aspirations may increase faster than do living standards. Expanded opportunity may thus result in political discontent rather than in increased satisfaction with government as suggested in Tocqueville’s earlier work. We develop a formal model to capture Tocqueville’s (1856) verbal theory and test its predictions using a 2012–2013 face-to-face survey experiment conducted in Pakistan. The experiment utilizes standard treatments to manipulate either a participant’s perceptions of his own economic well-being, his perceptions of society-wide mobility, or both. As predicted by the theory, political discontent often rises the most when declining personal well-being coincides with high mobility. The results thus identify the conditions under which expanded economic opportunity can lead to political unrest.We consider the thesis of Alexis de Tocqueville (1856) that economic development and increased mobility may generate political discontent that is not present in more stagnant economies. For many citizens, as they become aware of the potential for improvement, aspirations may increase faster than do living standards. Expanded opportunity may thus result in political discontent rather than in increased satisfaction with government as suggested in Tocqueville’s earlier work. We develop a formal model to capture Tocqueville’s (1856) verbal theory and test its predictions using a 2012–2013 face-to-face survey experiment conducted in Pakistan. The experiment utilizes standard treatments to manipulate either a participant’s perceptions of his own economic well-being, his perceptions of society-wide mobility, or both. As predicted by the theory, political discontent often rises the most when declining personal well-being coincides with high mobility. The results thus identify the conditions under which expanded economic opportunity can lead to political unrest. ∗We thank the dedicated team at Innovative Development Strategies (IDS), who in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), carried out the extensive data collection activities for our Pakistan Rural Household Panel Survey (RHPS). We also thank Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse and Tanguy Bernard for providing us with the Aspirations module from the IFPRI Ethiopia Rural Household Survey, which helped inform the Aspirations module in the Pakistan RHPS. We gratefully acknowledge insightful comments and guidance from Adam Meirowitz, Emily Nacol, Danielle Resnick, Alan Wiseman, and Elizabeth Zechmeister, as well as the discussants and participants at the 2016 annual meeting of the Behavioral Models of Politics at University of Pittsburgh, Midwest Political Science Association, and the Southern Political Science Association. All remaining errors are our own. †Andrew Healy: Professor of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, One LMU Drive, Room 4229, Los Angeles, CA 90045 ([email protected]). ‡Katrina Kosec: Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute, Development Strategy and Governance Division, 2033 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006 ([email protected]). §Cecilia Hyunjung Mo: Assistant Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, PMB 0505, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203 ([email protected]); W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow and Robert Eckles Swain National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 434 Galvez Mall, Stanford, CA 94305.