Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium: Reply
نویسندگان
چکیده
We report a general theorem on sustaining cooperation in inlinitely-repeated games when the possibility of renegotiation constrains punishments not to harm both players. This result generalizes observations recently reported by E. van Damme (Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoner’s dilemma, L Econ. Theory 47 (1989), 206217) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic Literature classitication Number 026.
منابع مشابه
Contracts , Information Persistence , and Renegotiation ∗
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تاریخ انتشار 2003