Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Material Beings

Heidegger famously draws a distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, also sometimes known as the distinction between occurents and equipment. Some entities are ready-to-hand: they are tools, objects of use, cultural products, things of value and significance. Examples include hammers, doorknobs, books, can-openers, and pinball machines. Some entities are present-at-hand: among them are the objects of scientific inquiry, which have properties that can be characterized by mathematical physics. I will argue that Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand is a metaphysical distinction: nothing that is ready-to-hand is numerically identical with anything that is present-at-hand. In order to avoid begging any questions at the start, I’ll introduce some neutral technical terminology. Call those entities other than persons that persons can encounter within the world material beings. Some material beings are tables, H 2 O molecules, chairs, electrons, and gumball machines. Say that a material being is a work just in case (i) it comes into existence only in virtue of the activities of some person or persons, (ii) it could not have existed had that specific activity in virtue of which it came into being not been performed, (iii) it essentially bears some value-property or other. 1 Works, in short, are modally dependent on the behavior of persons. Let us say that a material being is an inert just in case it could exist and have the same intrinsic features even if there had never been any persons, and that it could exist even if it failed to exemplify any value-features. Inerts are modally independent of the existence or activities of human persons. The distinction between works and inerts is a metaphysical distinction. It is an open question whether there are any works or inerts. But it is certain that nothing is (or could be) both a work and an inert. 2