Munich Personal RePEc Archive Charity Auctions for the Happy Few
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winnerpay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove this, we consider a framework with complete information. Complete information is helpful and may reflect events that occur, for instance, in a local service club (such as a voluntary organization) or at a show-business dinner.
منابع مشابه
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Basel II IRB approach revisited: do we use the correct model?
متن کاملMunich Personal RePEc Archive Which demand systems can be generated by discrete choice ?
We provide a simple necessary and suffi cient condition for when a multiproduct demand system can be generated from a discrete choice model with unit demands.
متن کاملMunich Personal RePEc Archive Minimization of Keane ’ s Bump Function
I. Introduction: Andy Keane (1994) designed the " bump " function to test the performance of (constrained) optimization methods. The optimization problem of Keane's bump function may be presented as follows:
متن کامل